Southern Illinois University Carbondale

OpenSIUC
Articles

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice

2009

Toward a Criminology of International Criminal
Law: An Integrated Theory of International
Criminal Violations
Dawn L. Rothe
Old Dominion University

Christopher W. Mullins
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, mullinsc@siu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ccj_articles
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in International Journal of
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2009) (copyright Taylor & Francis),
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01924036.2009.9678798.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.

Toward a Criminology of International Criminal Law:
An Integrated Theory of International Criminal Violations

Dawn L Rothe

Christopher W Mullins

Abstract
Violations of international criminal law are a common occurrence around the globe. One
need only to read international news or visit intra-governmental (e.g., United Nations or
the International Committee Red Cross) or non-governmental organizations (e.g., Human
Rights Watch or Amnesty International) to be exposed to the vast numbers of crimes of
states, paramilitaries, and/or militias (e.g. the genocide in Sudan, the continued chaos,
civil strife and abuse of civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the protracted
war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda, etc).
Nonetheless, there has been relatively little attention paid to these types of offenses by
criminologists. Moreover, due to the complexities of these types of atrocities there has
been little to no development of a theoretical model that can aid in the analysis of such
crimes. As such, our goal with this article is to firmly place international crimes on the
criminological agenda by creating additional awareness of and interest in the most
massive, systematic, and gruesome types of crime; genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, crimes of aggression and other gross human rights violations, and to
introduce an integrated theory that can provide a frame for systematic analysis of and an
understanding of the etiological factors at play.
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Toward Criminology of International Criminal Law:
An Integrated Theory of International Criminal Violations
Introduction
Violations of international criminal law are a common occurrence around the
globe. One need only to read international news or visit intra-governmental (e.g., United
Nations or the International Committee Red Cross) or non-governmental organizations
(e.g., Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International) to be exposed to the vast numbers
of crimes of states, paramilitaries, and/or militias (e.g. the genocide in Sudan, the
continued chaos, civil strife and abuse of civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the protracted war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of
Uganda, etc). Nonetheless, there has been relatively little attention paid to these types of
offenses by criminologists. Moreover, due to the complexities of these types of atrocities
there has been little to no development of a theoretical model that can aid in the analysis
of such crimes. The extant criminological research on atrocities such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and/or crimes of aggression have either focused on the
methodologies for verifying numbers of victims (see Hagan 2006), post-trauma responses
and controls (see here), crimes of globalization (see Rothe, Mullins, and Sandstrom 2008)
or have been placed under the category of state crime (Friedrichs YR; Kauzlarich and
Kramer 1998; Kramer and Michalowski 2005; Mullins and Rothe 2007; and Rothe and
Mullins 2006).
The categorization of these types of atrocities as state crime or as a form of crimes
of globalization has indeed led to the development of several case studies and generated
additional attention to criminology’s role in understanding the worst of international
crimes yet, we believe that such atrocities do not always fit neatly into the category of
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crimes of the state. For example, Kramer and Michalowski (2005) defined state crime as
any action violating public international law, international criminal law, when these
actions are committed by individuals acting in official or covert capacity as agents of the
state pursuant to expressed or implied orders of the state. Indeed, in some cases regimes
are directly or indirectly involved in such atrocities. However, in many of these atrocities
paramilitaries and or militias play a central role. They are not agents of the state. While
there are cases of militias working for or with governmental support (e.g., the Janjaweed
and the Sudanese government), we cannot ignore those that do not (e.g., Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda) nor should we misclassify them as state crimes. In some
cases, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the government and its role in the
atrocities occurring there is too weak or nonexistent to be classified as state crime. In
others, the main actors are transnational organizations, with little state involvement. On
the other hand, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank group may be
indirectly involved in the atrocities, fitting into a category of crimes of globalization. As
such, attempting to fit violations of international criminal law into one general typology
can be problematic. This is yet another reason why any theoretical development must be
complex and general enough to address the multiple forms and means of these atrocities.
Consequentially, our goal with this article is to not only place international crimes
on the criminological agenda by creating additional awareness of and interest in the most
massive, systematic, and gruesome types of crime; genocidei, crimes against humanityii,
war crimesiii, crimes of aggression and other gross human rights violations, but to
introduce an integrated theory that can provide a frame for systematic analysis and
understanding of the etiological factors at play. After all, many mainstream and critically-
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orientated theories of crime and criminality have relevance to the explanation of
violations of international criminal law, yet, standing alone each contains serious
shortcomings.
We begin with a brief overview of criminological theoretical research used to
analyze crimes of the state and other relevant theories. From there we present our
integrated theory of ‘supranational’ crimes. Simply, our aim is to introduce readers to the
idea of a criminology of international criminal law and to provide a general overview of
how an integrated criminological theory can provide a richer understanding of these
crimes.
Theory Building:
Towards International Violations of International Law
Traditional criminological inquiry has, for the most part, produced theories
addressing one specific level of analysis. While some scholars have ventured into
integrating traditional theories, they have done so by integrating theories addressing the
same level of analysis. Further, due to the complexities of these atrocities, utilizing
theories that explain only the individual level processes, that of organizations, controls, or
external precipitating conditions is bound to overlook the complexities of such cases and
provide no additional guidance for future understandings of atrocities or ability to foresee
potential situations prior to becoming full-blown violations of international criminal law.
While this may be an acceptable form of integration for some, we believe that an analysis
of phenomena that has such complexities as time-space, history, culture, politics,
ideology, and economics must include an integrated model that addresses all levels of
analysis: the structural to the individual(s) involved in the crimes.
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Despite Gottfried son and Hirschi’s (1992) insistence against theoretical integration,
especially when theories have potentially contradictory base-assumptions, we feel that
integration is the most viable path forward for theorizing the types of crimes we seek to
here. First, to ignore extant theory is to be forced to remake the wheel. Such a posture is
not only myopic in that it ignores decades of establish theorizing and theory testing, it is
arrogant in its rejection of what has come before. Further, we feel that the debate which
Gottfriedson and Hirschi (1992) have stimulated is misplaced and misconceptualized.
The core question, for example, is not whether social bonding theory’s assumptions about
inherent motivation are contradicted by learning theory’s assumptions of motivation as
learned. The question should be whether or not a reasonable empirical linkage exists
between a given model’s core indicators. “Human nature” as such is a black box concept
which cannot be observed or even inferred with any degree of accuracy. However,
decades of research have established that certain phenomena are related to crime
commission. The job then of an integrationist is to provide an underlying framework (and
set of assumptions) that make sense of empirical reality.
We are not the first scholars to present an integrated theoretical model of
corporate or governmental offending. This paper builds explicitly off of the theoretical
frame by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), which itself built of earlier work by Kramer and
Michalowski (1990), presented an integrated model of state offending that explored
motivation, opportunities, and controls at three levels of analysis: the interactional,
organizational, and the cultural-structural level. Moreover, their model integrates
components of several criminological theories that fall short by themselves in addressing
state crime. For example, Kauzlarich and Kramer utilize anomie and strain, rational
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choice, differential association, routine activities, political economy, and organizational
models. Kauzlarich and Kramer discuss how motivation is affected by one’s socialization
within that environment, the social meaning given to their behavior, an individual’s
goals, and issues of personality such as personal morality and obedience to authority.
Borrowing from Sykes and Matza, they include techniques of neutralization as a variable
of control. At the organizational level, Kauzlarich and Kramer draw heavily from
organizational theorists who argue that “there is built into the very structure of
organizations an inherent inducement for the organization itself to engage in crime”
(Gross quoted in Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998: 145). They, along with organizational
theorists, argue that organizations are strongly goal-orientediv and concerned with
performance while governing norms may be weak or absent (anomie). Moreover, these
goals may be blocked internally or externally causing strain (e.g., standard operating
procedures or codes of conduct). As Kauzlarich and Kramer argue, organizational crime
depends on two other factors—availability of illegal means and the social control
environment that fosters organizational crime (146). Organizational opportunities are said
to include instrumental rationality, role specialization, and task segregation while controls
include a culture of compliance, reward structure, safety and quality control procedures,
and effective communication processes.
At the structural or institutional level of analysis, the major social institutions and
social structure are included; particularly the political and economic institutions and their
interrelationship merit special attention in explaining organizational crime. They suggest
the primary assumption of that perspective is that the very structure of corporate
capitalism provides the impetus toward organizational crime (146), thus becoming crimes
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of capital (Michalowski 1985). They further propose that the political economy
perspective stresses the shaping and/or constraining influences of the broader historical
structure of a society as a factor on organizational behavior. This includes factors such as
the culture of competition, economic pressure, and performance emphasis under the
catalyst of motivation. Also needed is the availability of legal and illegal means, blocked
goals, and access to resources that are included under opportunities. Controls at the
structural level are said to include international reactions, political pressure, legal
sanctions, media scrutiny, and public opinion.
While we find this to be one of the most useful models in existence due to its
integrated and multi-level nature, we believe it fails to adequately incorporate the
increasingly international nature of criminality, especially cases that do not involve
typical western capitalistic based forms of state crime. Further, as it stands in the works
cited above, it is more or a theory that allows illumination of cases, instead of empirical
prediction and testing.
Save for recent work on crimes of globalization (see Friedrichs and Friedrichs
2002; Rothe, Muzzatti and Mullins 2006; Rothe, Mullins and Sandstrom 2008) most
organizational criminology, including state crime, has ignored the social forces and
incipient social structures occurring within the international realm in favor of focusing on
a state itself. Further, when the international arena is taken into account it is done so in a
rather simplistic manner resting upon a highly idealized and reified account of
globalization (Whyte 2003). While an international context may be assumed, it is not
fully specified or conceptualized in how it influences decision making at the state level.
What ever occurs at the supra-national level is perceived as a state-level influence. State
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policies are viewed as inevitably market driven as such, the focused is limited to the
dynamics of a global and capitalistic economy, most notably, U.S. centered. However,
the institutional elements and context of a state, it’s economic, political, cultural, and
historical environment, is distinct from and often exhibiting forces in contradiction with
those elements at the international level. These forces may influence the nature of social
forces within a state’s macro-level structure, but can also exert their own unique
influences. Any given state, and the social structure it represents, will be the product of
long-term historical contingencies and forces that necessitate an examination of factors
more traditionally referred to as macro-level forces. Broader cultural, political and
economic factors in play at a given time and space can to a greater or lesser extent
produce a given crime.
For example, the cases currently under investigation at the ICC share a similar
history of colonial rule (e.g., Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad
and The Sudan). However, such historical conditions did not result in consistent postindependence outcomes. Uganda’s transition to independence was relatively peaceful,
with internecine conflict erupting well into the post-indepence phase of its history.
Uganda inherited a stable economic and political structure. Contrarily, the DRC tore itself
apart in regional revolution within days of Belgium granting the Congo her indepence.
Issues of states’ specific religions, resources, and geographic and/or ethnic divisions were
also factors leading up the events under investigation at the court. Uganda’s problems
have largely been the result of two varying power bases competing for control over the
nation and her resources; the DRC has shown scores of groups with shifting alliances and
affiliations fighting betwixt and between themselves and each for control of regional

9

resource bases. Thus, ignoring these state-level differences fails to holistically address
the etiological and structural factors of the given crimes.
Since many of these crimes are committed within an organizational structure
(states, paramilitaries, militaries, etc) one must explore factors at play within the
organization itself. While the Kauzlarich and Kramer model (1998) incorporates elements
of organizational theory, it is limited to highly bureaucratic institutions or those based on
capitalistic profit generating tendencies. Broader theories of organizational behavior and
corporate offending highlight certain organizational structures may develop bureaucratic
environments where goal attainment is pushed to an “any means necessary” degree.
Certain organizations further reinforce instrumental rationality within decision making
processes (see Perrow 1986; Weber 1946) that can enhance the perceived value of
criminal behaviors and reduce the perceived harm of the same act. Cultures can develop
within organizations or subunits that can motivate criminal endeavors (see Sutherland
1949). The very nature of complex organizations provides a host of opportunity
producing elements. Bureaucracies can maintain levels of secrecy on how their resources
are utilized; external actors need not know what was done within the organization or by
whom. Information may also be hidden from other organizational actors, including those
who are actually carrying out elements of the criminal activity. Due to internal
organizational structures of information control, the ability of external agencies to obtain
information on the nature and dynamics of these decision-making events heighten
criminal tendencies (Rothe and Mullins 2006c).
As corporate crime researchers have shown, some organizations are much more
criminogenic than others. As we present in our model and have suggested elsewhere,
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many of these types of crimes are committed by militias and paramilitaries that do not fit
into the organizational model conceived by many organizational theorists. As such, the
social processes and a broader conception of organizational cultures is essential in
understanding these crimes. For example, The Lord’s Resistance Army’s long-standing
opposition to the Ugandan government is the product of post-colonial political forces and
the end result of series of coups and counter-coups. The operative ideology of the LRA
is religious in nature, replicating the discourse of Alice/Laweka of the Holy Spirit
Movement Army. Further, there is an ethic basis to the LRA, as it is mostly composed of
Acholi from the Ankula region. Within the same conflicts, the Ugandan armed forces the
Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) have also committed vast atrocities on
citizens in refugee camps. For example, state troops stationed as guard for displaced
persons camps frequently intimidate, rob and rape women as they leave to collect
firewood and other essentials. Men who leave are often beaten or murdered. These men
are not acting on orders but simply abusing the position of power they inhabit. In
contrast, the Sudanese regime has actively supported the Janjaweed militia in carrying
out massive crimes against humanity not for profit or due to its bureaucratic structure, but
instead through motivations based on alliances for political reasons that aid their agenda.
Governmental forces aid in the militias atrocities as well as abide by a systematic state
policy focusing on continuing the violence and crimes at hand. The government provides
payment, arms and other equipment for the Janjaweed, as well as its marching orders.
Thus, while superficially similar, each of these cases exhibits a complexity of
organizational forces. Further, looking beyond the capitalistic notion of organizational
structures as corporate entities, we find that within certain organizations the presence of a
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reward structure does not ensure compliance, instead it creates the very crimogenic
tendencies that scholars have believed reduce or control criminality.
There is also a need to include aspects of associational and social learning
theories (e.g., Akers 1977; Sutherland 1939) and core elements of symbolic
interactionism (e.g., perceptual aspects and definition of the situation) to understand these
phenomena. As noted by Sutherland (1949:300), “Any person can be trained to adopt and
follow a pattern of criminal behavior”. The idea of learning criminal behaviors through
socialization is not only relevant in organizational settings but also in a larger cultural
setting. Again, cultural elements discussed above come to bear—both in the broader
socio-cultural sense and organizational cultures which the individual has been socialized
into. Certain organizations may inculcate actors into broader ideological beliefs that
facilitate violating laws; day-to-day interactions provide ample opportunity for the
transmission not only of criminogenic value systems but also of neutralizations to excuse
such behaviors. Akers (1973, 1977, 1996, 1998) social learning theory wherein: 1)
deviant behavior is learned through operant conditioning; 2) the behavior is learned nonsocially and through social interaction vis a vis reinforcements; 3) the major part of
deviant behavior is learned in groups that control the major source of reinforcements; and
4) the learning of techniques, attitudes, avoidance is a function of re-enforcers.
This model is useful combined with Sutherland’s Differential Association for
providing an understanding in some cases. For example, as seen with child-soldiers who
are forced to commit atrocities, the process of stimuli presentation-negative and positiveis routinely used to ensure obedience. Child soldiers are motivated/rewarded with
personal praise, social inclusion, drugs and valuable items. They are also brutally
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disciplined, or forced to carry out beatings on their peers as both punishment and
conditioning. Further, new child recruits are trained and socialized into the militia by
their peers.
A separate body of criminological theory emphasizes the influence of social
disorder within immediate residential environments as having powerful criminogenic
effects. Typically referred to as social disorganization theory (see Shaw and McKay
1942; Bursik and Grasmick 1993), this line of theorizing suggests that when communities
posses a diminished capacity to create and enact informal mechanisms of social control,
or exhibit levels of collective efficacy, crime rates increase due to the lack of community
self-organization. Essential a control theory of crime, this work points out that indicators
of concentrated disadvantage are largely responsible for the reduction of a community’s
ability to act collectively. Additionally, European and American criminologists have
established that these disorganized social environments also have a pronounced tendency
to produce criminal enterprises of varying levels of organizations—be they street gangs,
mafia groups, crime syndicates, or drug cartels. In the absence of legitimate forms of
social organization, illegal organizations—or at least groups who engage in persistent
criminal behavior—proliferate to provide social structures and opportunities absent due
to broader conditions of institutional failures. Here, wide-spread social disorganization is
most readily apparent in producing militias.
Widespread abject poverty, a lack of functioning infrastructure and social
institutions severely undercut by de-colonization creates a profound vacuum of social
order. These illicit organizations arise in such contexts to structure life and provide
opportunities for community members to realize meaningful social identities. Militias
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specifically operate in this fashion. Not only do they provide much need community
defense, but they also provide a normative environment to give social actors bereft to
opportunity a real social location. Further, they are often the only meaningful
opportunity for income and self empowerment.
A related, yet separate, concept to social disorganization is anomie. Unlike
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), we use anomie in the Durkheimien sense wherein anomie
assumes that rapid social change has had mass societal affects that led to normlessness in
a structure that has lack of social constraints or regulation. While no longer applicable to
conditions of rapid social change envisioned by Durkheim, the transition from
mechanical to organic society, the relevance of anomie understood in these terms can be
seen with conditions left by abrupt colonial departures or coups, often dismantling entire
sets of socio-political structures. Not only do such events rearrange governmental
structures, the organization of economic ownership and production are reconfigured as
well.
Weak institutions produce a vacuum of formal and informal social control. A
country unable to adequately police or subdue a paramilitary force in its hinterlands
creates a gap of institutional control that simultaneously provides motivation and
opportunity for the arisal of organized criminal activity. Informal controls, such as
modalities of socialization, behavioral controls operating within other institutions such as
the family, education, or religion, are distinctly weakened in these environments. This
allows for more easeful transmission of subcultural values allowing and encouraging
criminality, as well as other beliefs which can feed into criminogenic forces (e.g., racism
aiding genocidal events). On the other hand, Durkheim and others such as Colvin and

14

Cullin (2004) have recognized that overregulation can also create crimogenic
environments at the state level. For example, history has shown that overregulated nationstates have resulted in terrible atrocities such as the Soviet Gulag system. Further, the
vast literature on the Holocaust points to the hyper-centralization of power during the
Nazi regime as both motivation and facilitation of the genocide at all levels of analysis.
Merton’s (1938) classic structure-strain theory is also of relevance. While often
presented as one theory, Merton proposed two separate theoretical concepts, anomie and
strain. According to Merton, strain occurs when attaining culturally emphasized goals
and expectations are unattainable, either due to blocked goals or means. As such, the
intrinsic value of following norms is meaningless without the attainment of the goals.
Further, to attain these by institutionalized means is not as important as the end means of
having attained them. As such, criminality stems from blocked goals. We see strain
operating in different forms when anomic conditions or those from highly social
disorganized areas. For example, through years of political turmoil and marginalization,
many militia groups enact alternative means to accomplish political capital, including
coups and/or insurgencies that are directly related to the atrocities this theory aims to
explain (e.g., LRA in Uganda or the Darfur insurgency that sparked the Sudanese
government’s harsh military response and collusion with the Janjaweed).
In line with the majority of traditional criminological theories, we do not ignore
the influence of individuals and individual decision makers within these events in
explaining criminality. All acts require that a singular social actor make a decision and
produce an act. In any crime involving state, militia, or paramilitary actors, orders to
carry out the activities must be developed, agreed upon, and enacted. Within a
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bureaucracy as complex as a polity, this involves not one, but a multitude of social actors
in a number of organizational positions. Structure clearly frames action and thought,
channeling human behavior toward certain outcomes and away from others; it defines
possibilities and molds goal structures. Social actors respond to stimuli within their
environments, yet exercise individual choice in decision-making processes based on any
number of variables. While individual agency is indeed modified or even extremely
constrained by the social conditions present within any complex organization, no
bureaucratic actor is a mere automaton. Individuals carry with them pre-established
cultural and ideological visions. Such lens influence how they evaluate information,
create policy objectives and direct organization activities to the realization of those
policies. More essentially, at the top levels of power, agency can often be fully revealed
and active. While indeed processes like groupthink can come into play, original
decisions, directives, and directions must be established through some form of agentic
decision making process. While such individual predilections and predispositions are
often overlooked, it must be acknowledged that the perpetrators and the decision-makers
in these cases possess agency. They are not automatons blindly responding to sociopolitical forces, but rather lively social actors who often wield large amounts of social
power and institutional authority that can be brought to bear in the commission of a
crime.
State crime scholars have identified external and internal controls on the behavior
of states (see Ross 1995, 2000). External controls have been defined as those that lie
outside of the specific state apparatus and are imposed on the state itself. Internal controls
are those that arise within the state and are directed against itself such as previously
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discussed domestic laws and self-regulation. These controls can be tangible (i.e., the
firing of an agent) or symbolic (i.e., an official statement of denial or a promise to
investigate). Internal controls are broadly conceived of as restrictions placed on state
agencies by themselves or other state agencies. The United Kingdom’s establishment of a
Royal Commission on Police Procedure and a Police Complaints Board in response to
police brutality (Ross 2000b), the passing of the Parliament of Canada Act and the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Corrado and Davis 2000), the Zorea,
Blatman, and Karp Commissions in Israel (Miller 2000) and campaign finance reform
laws in Japan (Potter 2000), are all examples of such internal controls. Suggested external
controls within the state have included (1) media organizations, (2) interest groups, and
(3) domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). External controls located outside
of the state would include the United Nations (UN), the World Court (WC), the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and, potentially, other states. As internationallysanctioned bodies, these organizations hold the power to apply sanctions to states which
violate either international law or are overly abusive of their own citizens. However, the
ability to back up sanctions with coercive force is limited to members who are willing to
volunteer the necessary force to act in the organization’s name. It is for this reason that
U.S. violations of international law regarding nuclear weapons have gone unsanctioned
(Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Also, economic organizations such as the World Bank
(WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
represent potential controls on criminal states through the manipulation of financial
assets, trade agreements, and trade sanctions. However, as other scholars have noted,
these same institutions may directly or indirectly create the crimogenic conditions that
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lead to these types of atrocities (Friedrichs and Friedrichs 2007; Rothe, Muzzatti, and
Mullins 2006; Rothe, Mullins, and Sandstrom 2008).
Controls have also been used to explain criminality. Tittle’s (1995) Control
Balance Theory was based on the premise that the amount of control to which an
individual is subject compared to the amount of control the individual can exercise
determines the probability of deviance. Tittle recognizes that constraints and controls
constitute inhibitors of actions (if not actors). Control is not viewed in the context of a
complete prevention but as a means that the actions can be limited; “control incorporates
the idea of barriers, or constraints” (Tittle 1995, 143). Tittle refers to constraint as the
probability (or perceived probability) that potential control will actually be exercised.
While Ross (2000) and Title (1995) provide valuable insight into controls and
constraints, we believe these are not conceptually interchangeable. Phenomenologically,
a constraint differs from a control in that it is an inhibitor or barrier that occurs at the
onset of or during an illegal action. This constraint can act as a complete blockage to the
act, or it can act as a restraint, that inhibits or causes the actor(s) to find alternative means
to crime enactment. A control, on the other hand, is a formal mechanism meant to block
in full an illegal action or ideally hold accountable through prosecution, sanctions, or
some form of social justice post-criminality. Having briefly reviewed some of the key
contributions to our proposed integrated theory, we now turn to what we believe is a
comprehensive tool that can aid the systematic study and explanation of the worst crimes
known to humanity.

An Integrated Theory of International Criminal Violations
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With the complexities of these crimes, it is necessary to examine catalysts and
inhibitors at all levels of analysis. In doing so, the integrated theory we propose combines
insights from criminological theory that help to explain the multiple levels at play within
each specific case. Any given incident of international crime is a product of a myriad of
social forces which come together in the production of the event in question. Thus,
attention must be given to specific time-space. Global political and economic conditions
are one variable that makes these crimes more or less likely, provide tensions and
contradictions for countries to navigate, and present problems for state actors to
resolve—either criminally or legally. Contextualization of such acts is essential to
understand both the idiosyncrasies of an individual event as well as the patterns which
emerge in the phenomena as a whole.
Moreover, any given crime is a product of multiple catalysts and forces; to fully
elucidate a singular occurrence, one must examine a number of factors at multiple levels
of analysis. Consequently, our theoretical model recognizes the necessary catalysts of
motivation, opportunity, constraints and controls for each of these levels. As such it
contains both breadth and depth. Building upon the early works of Kramer and
Michalowski (1990), Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), Rothe and Mullins (2006), and
Mullins and Rothe (2007), we present an integrated theory of international criminal law
violations and state offending that recognizes the inherent complexity of these
phenomena. Such analytical acuity allows a precise pin-pointing of key forces and how
they interact within a specific criminal event or context (see Figure One).
[Figure One About Here]
Motivation
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Unlike some criminological theories that assume motivation is either mundane or
unimportant (e.g., most control, routine activities, and deterrence theories), especially for
the crimes examined here, we feel motivation is a crucial theoretical component. The
assumption of motivation being consistently present, and as such irrelevant to consider,
can be linked back to the classical school perspective wherein human nature is perceived
as hedonistic. While we agree with key postulates of Routine Activities Theory, the
elements of a motivated offender, suitable targets (opportunity), and capable guardians
(operationality of control), and the concept of bounded rationality that illuminates
situational factors, we do not agree that “criminal inclination is a given and…[we need
to] examine the manner in which the spatio-temporal organization of social activities
helps translate their criminal inclinations into action” 1979:589). Rather, we see
motivation as an essential variable to be explained. The complex psychological, social
and cultural factors (as well as interactions among these factors) which produce
motivation are not so easily dismissed. We do not believe that the drive to genocide or
mass atrocity is inherent in all human cognitive processes that merely need to be
controlled.
Those theories that assume motivation tend to resort to simplistic explanations
that take for granted the rewards of crimes are self-contained and self-evident. However,
especially for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the acts are not
necessarily inherently rewarding, nor do they necessarily involve hedonistic tendencies or
other seemingly innate human psycho-social drives. If they were, such wide spread
criminal atrocities would be much more common than they are, especially considering
the derth of controls on such behaviors.
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Motivation is the constellation of the general and specific drives that lure and
entice a given organization and/or organizational actor toward offending. Specific
motivating forces can include the enhancement and/or maintenance of political power
(e.g., the LRA’s focused attempts to overthrow the Museveni regime), personal or
organizational economic gain (e.g., the Janjaweed and its members), access to valuable
natural resources (e.g., multiple forces within the DRC fighting over control of the mines
in the mineral rich northeast and southeast), religious factors (e.g. the LRA), or revenge
(e.g., the Hutu). Often, these factors interact with others to create more intensely
motivated populations. As an example, the primary motivation of LRA fighters is their
belief that their struggle against the Museveni regime is a divine calling directed and
guided by God through the prophet Joseph Kony. Additionally, the LRA leadership is
driven by political and personal desires for power. Many soldiers within the LRA are
remnants of older, defeated militaries which seek revenge against the Museveni regime.
General motivations, while often linked to specific, can include factors such as political
marginalization of a specific group or party (e.g., colonial powers often marginalized a
portion of the population, giving specific preferential treatment to one group). In turn,
this can result in specific motivating factors including political or economic gain. Further,
ethnic divisions that were created by either colonial or post-colonial authorities can lead
to specific motivation including revenge and/or the destruction of the reified
‘dehumanized other’. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that while we identify
general (or modal) motivation factors, there can also be a wide variety of motivations
individually within a criminal group (see Smeulers 2007).
Opportunities
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Opportunities are those social interactions where the possibility for a crime to be
committed emerges and presents itself to a motivated offender (see Felson 1998). While
all the motivation in the world may be present without opportunity there cannot be a
commission of a crime. Further, just as Cloward and Ohlin (1963) stated, the presence of
legitimate and illegitimate opportunity must be taken into account. This is especially true
give the use of international law as a standard for defining the criminality.
As an example at the macro-level, being a state strongly enhances the ability to
create and capitalize upon criminal opportunity. Even the poorest countries have
tremendous amounts of human and financial capital to draw upon for crime commission.
On the other hand, the desirability of drawing upon illegal means will be even more
tempting when legal means of accomplishing the goals are absent, blocked, or
constrained. Further the inaction of local or international bystanders will also facilitate
the generation of opportunity (see Grunfeld 2007). On the meso-level, opportunity for
specific actors is affected by the larger culture and/or state structure. For example, in the
case of the Sudanese genocide, the opportunity for the Janjaweed to commit the crimes
against humanity thus far has been provided by the el-Bashir regime’s collusion. The
opportunity for the LRA to commit atrocities and continue in a 20 year long conflict was
largely been created by the direct economic and social support of the Sudanese
government as well as their de facto control of the northern hinterlands.
Constraints
Constraints are those social elements that stand to potentially make a crime either
riskier or less successful; offenders must navigate around a constraint. We envision these
as taking several forms, including what other scholars have defined as controls:

22

international reactions; political pressures; public opinion, international social
movements, oversight from agencies such as the United Nations; political pressures;
media scrutiny; and socialization. Simply, a constraint differs from a control in that
constraints are not expected to fully control or block state or organizational crimogenic
behaviors, nor do they act to penalize violators. Instead, by definition they serve as
potential barriers before or during an act (Rothe and Mullins 2006). Nonetheless, states
are often in unique positions to both navigate around extant constraints and/or to
neutralize the power they represent. For example, Sudan was able to circumvent the
constraints NGO’s represented by curtailing the ability of aid workers to effectively
monitor the regime’s activities or have access to civilians that provide testimony of the
abuses. Additionally, states can attempt to neutralize international pressures by
rhetorically framing the events in question as “insurgent activity” and/or cases of general
banditry by militias. When organizations are sponsored by the government, they are
effectively freed from potential constraints of the population or foreign involvement.
Having said this, a constraint’s ineffectiveness does not negate its presence. Minimally,
additional actions are required by the criminal actor which led to additional costs, be they
real or opportunity. Further, the power of constraints to stymie criminal actions can be
enhanced by examining how states negotiated prior constraints.
Controls
A control is a complete blockage to an act or when a criminal penalization is
ideally inevitable after the fact. This means that conceived criminal action will not occur
and, if it does, ideally there will be legal repercussions. Of course, there is no such thing
as noting is universal or inevitable. Unlike constraints, we view controls as institutions
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that have the ability to stave off or prevent entirely the criminal action or to ideally
address such violations as an after-the-fact mechanism in the form of accountability.
With any type of offending this typically is in the form of formal social controls such as
laws and/or regulations that can act as deterrents or provide accountability, punishment,
or sanctions.
. As a control, laws are indeed present and as was noted by Rothe and Mullins
(2006c; 2007), deterrence based on extant laws should be more promising for actors
committing crimes that constitute violations of international criminal law than that of
traditional street crime being deterred by laws due to the social integration and position of
most potential offenders. As street crime and white collar crime research has shown,
social location and position strongly influences deterrence (see for example, Berk at el
1992; Paternoster and Piquero 1995; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Piquero and
Paternoster, 1998; Stafford and Warr, 1993). Those actors most likely to be involved in
these types of crimes would seem to be those who are most influenceable by law. On the
other hand, the work of Tittle (1995) suggests that the social positions and general
practices of militia leaders would not be as likely to be deterred by the law due to the
levels of power and control they wield. Consequentially, deterrence could potentially
only serve as a control if continued prosecutions for these types of crimes occur via the
International Criminal Court (ICC). For example, the ICC claims that their indictments
have simultaneously reduced the violence within Northern Uganda and compelled the
LRA back into peace talks (Agirre 2007). Further, such controls can also be nationally
generated but locally implemented (e.g., the Gacaca’s in Rwanda, see Havemen 2007, or
any court in the world).
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Causal Logic
While our discussions above identifies and describes key etiological factors
functioning at all levels of analysis, in and of itself, the discussion does not specifically
identify and discuss causal relations. In order to build a thoroughly predictive model,
something not yet done with the core of the integrated model we present above, we
specify and detail such relationships. (see Figure two).
[figure two about here]
We have presented a complicated theory of complicated phenomena. To elucidate the
causal relationship among the important catalysts we discuss above, we have found it
necessary to draw upon the idea of nodes of interconnection (Tittle 1995). Following
Control Balance theory, we propose that the various elements of theoretical significance
examined above will come to influence social structure and behavior through nodes (e.g.,
those boxes numbered 1-4 in Figure Two). While the important theoretical issues operate
at multiple levels of analysis, at the end of the day, so to speak, a crime is still committed
by an individual social actor acting based upon decision making processes. Yes, crimes
have macro-level causes and in many cases the social actor of interest is a component of a
social organization instead of an atomistic individual, the specific criminal action is still
individualized in its commission (even if the unit of analysis or explanation is
organizations a singular or very small group of people still make the decision to offend).
Thus, one should examine the aggregate effects of a catalyst at the different levels of
analysis above the micro level as they come together to create a social force. While it is
possible, for example, to identify motivational forces at all four levels of analysis,
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functionally, they all produce motivation within individuals (and organizations for that
matter).
The Opportunity node then represents combined supra-individual level forces that
govern the presentation of opportunities to engage in violations of international criminal
law. We see this set of combined opportunities, filtered through individual perception, as
being positively related to micro-level motivation, which can in and of itself vary
independently from the nodal influence. Then, micro-level motivation has a direct effect
on crime commission and on micro-level motivation to offend (acknowledging the real
possibility that one may be much more inclined to offend when presented with a clear
opportunity to do so).
The Motivation node is similarly conceived. The various levels of motivating
forces combine to jointly influence micro-level motivation for offending in a positive
direction. Micro level motivation would be positively related to crime commission.
As constraints (and controls) tend to exist externally of individuals (save internal
moral precepts), we conceive of all four levels of analysis combining in effect to create a
singular Constraint node. The aggregate effects of constraints then act as a negative
moderating effect on the translation of opportunity and motivation effects on offending
behavior. Restated, we see constraints as not influencing (mediating) motivation or
opportunity directly but rather as reducing the strength of the relationship between
motivation and/or opportunity and offending. We propose the same set of conditions and
relationships for the Control node. While constraints and controls block offending
behavior, or at least alter enactment patterns, they do not necessarily in and of themselves
reduce opportunity or motivation factors. Simply because raping a woman of a defeated
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population is prohibited by Geneva and Rome does not make a solider less desirous of
doing so, nor does it ultimately reduce the nature of interactional opportunity an LRA
combatant experiences when coming across a lone woman gathering firewood in the
forest of Northern Uganda. Yet, such legal mechanisms may inhibit his acting on that
combination of motivation and opportunity.
It is our hope that such a causal model allows researchers to move beyond the
typical case study method used by most scholars of state crime or others studying crimes
of this magnitude. It provides a model wherein key variables listed in the theoretical
frame can be tested and can aid in the creation of a database for a met-analysis of the core
and persistent etiological factors of atrocities.
Conclusion
By bringing mass atrocities to criminological attention, we hope to not only push
the boundaries of the discipline itself but shine light on the nature of these mass
violations of human life and dignity. Such instances of wide-scale violence present
problems of interpretation that defy the use of any single extant theory in the field; our
integrated theory provides the tools necessary to unpack these complex events and
produce both singular and comparative explanations. While these crimes may be more
difficult to study than other crimes, there are still numerous ways to gather and analyze
data on these atrocities. Complex statistical analyses are not yet possible, but the
compilation of data from existing sources provides hope for such work in the future.
Criminology as a disciple has shied away from the study of atrocity. Its selfdefinition has long been focused on street crimes and policies designed to curtail them.
We see this as highly problematic. If criminology as a discipline cannot explain the
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worst crimes that humans commit, then it is not living up to its stated agenda. By
bringing a criminological focus to these crimes we cannot only better understand the
etiology of these events, we can better assess potential control modalities to reduce or
eliminate future atrocities. In many ways, that is a much more essential task than mere
academic explanation. Anything that can potentially reduce the amount of harm done by
these crimes is well worth the effort and will go a long way to bringing more justice into
the world.
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Figure One: Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violations
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Figure Two: Causal Model
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Notes
i

The term genocide was originally coined by Ralph Lemkin in 1933. Lemkin suggested a treaty should be
created to make attacks on religious, ethnic, or national groups an international crime. He called this
genocide: from the Greek word genos, meaning race or tribe, and cide, the Latin term for killing. Four
years passed before genocide was recognized as an international crime by treaty. However, the legal
foundation was first put in place during the 1945 Nuremberg Trials and subsequent Nuremberg Charter.
Genocide was used in the indictment against the Nazi war criminals that stated that those accused
“conducted deliberate and systematic genocide…the extermination of racial and national groups, against
the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of
people and national, racial or religious groups” (Orentlicher 2006:2). Nuremberg prosecutors also invoked
the term in their closing arguments. While the Nuremberg Charter did not use the term genocide per se, its
definition of crimes against humanity was very close to the idea of genocide Lemkin proposed. The
difference was the requirement of specific intent in the case of genocide, which is lacking in the definition
of crimes against humanity. In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution
establishing genocide as an international crime, defining genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of
entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings” (Resolution
95 (1)). In 1948, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted
by the United Nations. Article 1 states that “the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish” (General Assembly resolution 260 A (III)). Thus genocide may be committed by an
individual, group, or government, against one's own people or another, in peacetime or in wartime. This
last point distinguishes genocide from “crimes against humanity,” whose legal definition specifies wartime.
Additionally, the Convention obligates state party members to “prevent and punish” genocide. Since its
development in 1948 there has been a dearth of precedents that enforced the Convention. Specifically, it
was not until the 1990’s that the international arena prosecuted acts defined as genocide: the establishment
of the 1993 International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. In 1998, with the development of the Rome Statute, the crime of genocide was again reaffirmed
as an international crime with the requirements of both a physical element (comprising certain enumerated
acts) and a mental element (intent). Specifically, Article 5 of the ICC lists genocide (and crimes against
humanity) as a crime of “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”
Genocide is then defined in Article 6. Both the physical and mental requirements of the 1948 Convention
were carried over and included in the Rome Statute.
ii

The international arena’s early attempts to develop humanitarian law during the 19th and early 20th
Centuries wholly focused on war crimes. The term crimes against humanity, however, originated in the
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1907 Hague Convention preamble that codified extant customary law of armed conflictii. This was based
on existing state practices derived from the values and principles deemed to constitute the laws of humanity
(Bassiouni 2006). After World War I, in connection with the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and relying upon
the 1907 Hague Convention, a commission to investigate war crimes was created. In addition to war
crimes committed by the Germans, the commission also found that Turkish officials committed crimes
against the laws of humanity for killing Armenian nationals and residents during the period of the war
(Bassiouni 2006:2). Such investigations set the framework for legitimating the idea of an international
criminal law; a process that was to become codified after the next global conflict. In 1945 the United States
and Allies developed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which defines and delineates
crimes against humanity in Article 6(c). The Nuremberg Charter was the first document to establish crimes
against humanity as a part of positive international law. The concept originated in order to prosecute Nazis
and Japanese warlords for the atrocities of WWII that were outside of the existing 1907 Hague
Conventions. Acts like the Nazi Holocaust cried out for international legal action, but there was no
international law to draw upon. As many of these actions were not committed by uniformed armed forces
on the field of battle, existing war crimes laws did not hold jurisdiction. Initially crimes against humanity
was an ad hoc concept developed in response to idiosyncratic sets of events; since, the category has,
become one of the central bodies of International Criminal Law. Crimes against humanity have been
included in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Specifically, Article 7 of which states that crime against humanity means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of
apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health. Indeed crimes against humanity have come to “mean
anything atrocious committed on a large scale” (Bassiouni 2006:1). Further, this body of law governs the
behaviors not only of states and state actors, but also of quasi-military bodies (e.g., militias), transnational
organizations and of individuals.
iii

European-based cultures have been formally developing and refining the notion of war crimes--illegal
actions which occur on the field of battle--since the 1800s. As technologies of warfare became increasingly
lethal, and civilians increasingly victimized, western nations moved to limit the types of weapons and
tactics used. The late 1800s and early 1900s saw numerous multi-lateral treaties entered into, only to be
violated in subsequent conflicts. The end of World War I saw these laws first coupled with enforcement
mechanisms, though the tribunals were piecemeal and largely symbolic. After World War II, The
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals set the international standard for the convening of special courts to try
cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These tribunals were initiated by, and governed under,
the Nuremberg principles, whose primary purpose was to establish a set of guidelines for defining and
identifying war crimes. Principle VI (b) defines War crimes as: Violations of the laws or customs of war
which include but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation of slave labor or for any other
purpose the civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
person on the Seas, killing of hostages, plunder of private or public property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity. While these principles were designed
post hoc to try German Nazi and Japanese Imperial leaders they form the bedrock of later United Nations
and the International Criminal Court’s definitions. Following the Nuremberg principles, a complex set of
definitions and rules of warfare were codified. Today, the term “war crime” typically refers directly to a
violation of the four The United Nations Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field and its attendant protocols. These laws are applicable to every state,
as recognition by the United Nations requires ratification of the UN Charter and the ratification by the
applicant state of these conventions. Geneva governs the ways in which armed forces are allowed to
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operate within theatres of battle and occupied territories. Specific laws govern weapons and tactics,
allowable targets, treatment of medical and religious personnel, the treatment of prisoners, and how an
armed force is to interact with non-combatants. For our purposes, the general rules of allowable targets are
highly relevant, as most parties involved in the incidents target civilians and civilian areas. The rules of war
also constrain the ways in which occupying forces are to administer, conquer and/or otherwise occupy
territories. For example, an occupying force is not allowed to press the civilians into labor, plunder or loot
the conquered territory. Any army must administer such resources in the best interests of the civilian
population. While Geneva rests at the core of laws governing armed conflict, the 20th century has seen
wide expansions of this legal code, with new crimes being defined to cover gaps or vagaries within the
Geneva Conventions.
iv

. These include operative goals, subunit goals, and managerial goals.
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